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INSURANCE: JOINDER OF DEFENDANT'S INSURER,
A RESOLUTION OF THE "SELLMAN" PROBLEM*
As the law in New Mexico stands today, an insurer who pays a
claim to its insured under an indemnity policy is subrogated by
operation of law to a proportionate part of the cause of action
against the person who caused the loss. This is the rule irrespective of
any agreement to the contrary between the insurer and its insured.'
Loan receipts, which are recognized by nearly all states and the
federal courts to be a valid method of avoiding subrogation,2 have
been generally ignored by everyone concerned. When the insurer
pays its insured any amount of the loss, he is deemed to be an
indispensible party in any subsequent action against the person responsible for the loss.' This has the anomalous effect of forcing a
plaintiff's insurer to join in the action while disallowing any disclosure of the existence of the defendant's insurer, or even whether
or not he is insured.4 Sellman v. Haddock,' decided in 1957, established this rule, and it has been followed quite uniformly ever since. 6
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the effects of the Sellman
rule and suggest possible solutions for some of the problems arising
from this decision.
In Sellman, suit had been brought to collect damages caused to the
plaintiff's automobile in an intersection collision with the defendant.
Under the terms of his policy, the plaintiff had paid $50.00 of the
cost of repairs and the insurer had paid the balance of $483.21.
When the case was argued before the Supreme Court the defendant
*Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
1. The only exception to this rule would be if the subrogation had been waived for some
reason. There is no authority on this issue in New Mexico and very little elsewhere. For a
survey of this subject see 16 A.L.R.2d 1269 (1951).
2. 2 R. Long, Law of Liability Insurance § 23.09(1) (1966).
3. Note 11, infra.
4. The rule against disclosure of the defendant's insurer is well established in New
Mexico. Fort v. Neal, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (1968); (prejudicial effect recognized);
Falkner v. Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 391 P.2d 660 (1964) (mistrial if disclosure calculated to
influence the verdict); Canter v. Lowrey, 69 N.M. 81, 364 P.2d 140 (1961) (mistrial on voir
dire question on insurance if in bad faith); Garcia v. Sanchez, 68 N.M. 394, 362 P.2d 779
(1961) (no mistrial when disclosed by defense attorney examining his own witness); Stalcup
v. Ruzic, 51 N.M. 377, 185 P.2d 298 (1947) (voir dire question as to possible interest in a
particular insurance company is allowed); Olguin v. Thygesen, 47 N.M. 377, 143 P.2d 585
(1943) (form of question on voir dire is largely in the trial court's discretion); Theurer v.
Holland Furnace Co., 124 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1941) (evidence relating to insurance inadmissible); Bass v. Dehner, 103 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1939) (plaintiff's counsel may not interrogate defendant's counsel on existence of insurance to obtain basis for interrogating
jurors).
5. 62 N.M. 391, 310 P.2d 1045 (1957).
6. Evidenced by the fact that it apparently hasn't been challenged. See infra.
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raised the issue of whether the plaintiff's insurer was an indispensible
party. This proved to be the determinative question of the case. The
evidence in the trial record led the court to conclude that the insurer
as if no
was an indispensible party, which disposed of the case "...
attempt at a trial had been made." 7
In answer to an interrogatory before trial, the plaintiff stated that
he had given his insurer a loan receipt, but he did not have a copy of
it to attach to his answer. As a result, no documentary evidence of
the agreement by which the insurer had paid its part of the repair bill
was ever introduced. Basing their decision on the oral testimony of
the plaintiff given during the trial, the Supreme Court decided a
subrogation had occurred. They reasoned that, since the plaintiff
stated he had given his insurer ". . . the right to collect from the
person who (had) caused the damage," 8 this was enough to justify
holding that the insurer had acquired a right against the defendant.
The court decided that the plaintiff's declaration of the import of
the agreement was more enlightening than calling it a loan receipt.
Actually, this determination was exactly the opposite of what was
intended in the loan agreement. One of the primary purposes of loan
receipts is to allow the insurer to pay a claim without acquiring an
interest in the cause of action.9 But the plaintiff in this case had
failed to prove that he had given a loan receipt to his insurer. Rather,
his testimony supported the opposite conclusion; that he had assigned a part of his cause of action to the insurer. It is true that the
court accepted a layman's interpretation of the legal effect of a
written instrument, but since the document had not been entered in
evidence they were probably justified in doing so. The court found
itself faced with quite a dilemma. It had to choose whether to accept
the plaintiff's testimony as to the effect of the agreement, or to
disregard the testimony concerning the payment by the insurer and
remand the case back to the trial court because of an inadequate
judgment, or affirm the judgment without settling the loan receipt
issue. They chose the former, and probably rightly so, since to have
chosen one of the latter two would have required them to disregard
the jurisdictional question of failure to join an indispensible party.
After deciding that the transaction between the plaintiff and his
insurer had given the insurer an interest in the cause of action, the
court concluded that the insurer was thereby a "real party in
7. Sellman v. Haddock, at 393.
8. Id. at 394.
9. Couch on Insurance § 61:72 (2d ed. 1966).
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interest"' 0 and that there could be only a single cause of action.' ,
Therefore the insurer was an indispensible party.'2 Thus, (1) subrogation; (2) real party in interest; (3) single cause of action; ergo,
indispensible party.
Apparently the insurance companies in New Mexico are satisfied
with this result, since as far as can be determined from subsequent
appellate cases, there have been no objections made to this joinder
requirement. In fact, they can probably afford to be ambivalent since
they may be involved on either side (plaintiff or defendant), depending on the particular case.
One of the primary effects of the Sellman rule would seem to be a
decrease in the average award of damages. There are at least two
reasonably anticipated results of the rule in support of this conclusion. First, it creates an appearance of unequal parties. Because of
this impression, the jury might be tempted to resolve some of the
critical issues in favor of the defendant. This could lead to a lessening
of the amount of the judgment, or in the case of a close question of
negligence, it might cause their decision in favor of the defendant,
thereby completely denying recovery to a truly deserving plaintiff.
Next, this disclosure that the insurer has paid a certain amount to its
insured would tend to determine the amount of damage suffered,
thereby liquidating the claim to the amount paid by the plaintiff's
insurer. This would be decidedly unfair to the plaintiff since the
insurer usually pays only the immediate expenses. With the amount
paid on the claim being continually brought to their attention by the
defendant's attorney, the jury might be reluctant to award him any
more than he had already received; which would deprive him of any
additional amounts to which he might rightfully be entitled. This
could be especially important in personal injury cases where medical
payments coverage was involved,' 3 because the loss of earning power
10. The tests for "real party in interest" are: (1) owner of right sought to be enforced;
(2) in a position to release defendant from liability. Reagan v. Dougherty, 40 N.M. 439, 62
P.2d 810 (1936).
11. Based upon the claim of negligence on the part of the defendant. Seliman v.
Haddock, at 403.
12. An additional holding of the Sellman case was that there is no distinction between
necessary and indispensable parties, as in the case in the federal courts. For a discussion of
this aspect of the case see Walden, The "New Rules" in New Mexico, 25 F.R.D. 107, 123.
13. In spite of the general rule that the doctrine of subrogation does not apply to
personal injury claims, the courts have generally allowed subrogation in medical payments
coverage when it was specifically provided for in the policy. Such was the ruling in a recent
New Mexico case, Motto v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 81 N.M. 35, 462 P.2d 620
(1969).
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and future medical expense items would likely be valued lower than
they should be.
It would seem possible that even if the plaintiff's insurer is unable
to recover enough to cover its expenditures in the case, the shortage
could eventually be recouped out of savings from cases when it is a
defendant's insurer. Therefore, as far as the insurer is concerned, the
average cost of doing business would have been reduced. On the
other hand, if this balancing effect does not occur, the insurer would
have to increase the premiums paid by the insured in order to recoup
any actual losses. In fact, the mere existence of such shortages (cost
to insurer less recovery) could afford an excuse for raising premiums
whether or not there has been an actual economic loss. The net effect
would be increased costs to the insured, which would discourage
people from carrying accident coverage. From a public policy standpoint, this result should be avoided, because this coverage is often
the only means for survival that an injured person has while the
matter is being pursued through the courts. A serious accident could
completely incapacitate the average person if he had to wait until
after a judgment in his favor before he received any compensation at
all. The only other alternative to such coverage is public aid in some
.form.' '
The primary objection voiced against joinder of the defendant's
insurer seems to be that it might prejudice the jury against the defendant which could lead to an excessive award.' s It is hard to see
the logic to this objection. Since the insurer would be the one who
would have to pay the claim, it doesn't seem that the defendant,
provided that his coverage was adequate to cover any possible award,
would care one way or the other. Any prejudice that would occur
wouldn't affect the defendant at all; it would only affect his
insurer.' 6 If the insurer is the one affected by the assumed prejudice,
it would seem to take most of the weight out of the principal
argument underlying the whole concept of exclusion, i.e., that the
insurer is not interested in the action until a judgment is entered.
More realistically, the insurer appears to have a substantial interest in
the case from the outset. If not, why would the insurer be interested
14. This choice between private or public compensation is a political question that will
have to be resolved according to whatever degree of public participation in the welfare of
the individual is desired. Private insurance is more in line with the basic American concept
of society, and is probably more efficient than a public enterprise would be, although the
cost is not distributed as broadly as it would be under a public-financed system.
15. See McKenna, Joining the Insurer and Insured in Automobile Cases, 17 Marq. L. Rev.
114 (1932); and Appleman, Joinder of Policyholder and Insurer as PartiesDefendant, 22
Marq. L. Rev. 75 (1938).
16. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593, 595 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
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in whether or not knowledge of its presence would prejudice the jury
against the defendant? It seems that the very argument advanced for
exclusion actually affirmatively establishes that the insurer is vitally
interested in the litigation. If the plaintiff's insurer is an indispensible
party because of its contractual relationship with its insured, a queer
distortion of logic is required to maintain that the defendant's insurer, under basically the same contractual relationship with its
insured, has no interest in the action.' ' This requires that the rights
of the parties to the contract be interpreted as dependent on the
parties' relationship with a third person. In other words, whether or
not the insured is required to join an action in which its insured is
involved depends on which side the insured is on; whether he is suing
or being sued.
The concept of depriving the jury of information concerning the
existence of insurance was apparently established through judicial
notice of the prejudicial effects that could possibly be anticipated if
such knowledge was disclosed." 8 As one author described it,
"(I)t is
the substitution of a judicial whim for a lawful right ...

producing a

judicial wrong against a party who is in court to avoid an imaginary
wrong to one who claims he is not in court."' '
Disallowal of disclosure seriously hampers litigation of the issues
by imposing substantial limitations on the manner in which the trial
is carried out.2 0 A litigant is continuously running a substantial risk
of causing reversible error by inadvertently disclosing the existence
of insurance during the trial.2 ' He finds himself facing an awesome
task in litigating such a case while being foreclosed in so many areas
by procedural difficulties created by his being unable to mention
anything concerning such an all-pervasive and prominent issue.
In summary, taking the present status of insurers in New Mexico
as a whole, a few reasons why the situation needs to be changed are:
(1) the prejudicial effects of requiring participation by the insurer on
one side and not the other; (2) refusing disclosure of defendant's
insurer is mere subterfuge which seems to have little real justification
and seems to serve no useful purpose; (3) it seriously hampers litigation of the issues; (4) freedom of contract is not allowed, and; (5) it
does not promote efficiency and economy in the administration of
17. It is anomalous, to say the least, that the plaintiff's insurer becomes an indispensable
party by complying with the terms of its contract with its insured, and the defendant's
insurer does not when it does exactly the same thing with its own insured.
18. Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 157, 160 (1954).
19. Allen, Why do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies, 61 Am. L. Rev. 77,
81 (1927).
20. Green, supra note 18, at 159.
21. Id.
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justice through allowing complete settlement of the case in a single
suit.
In devising a solution, the general principles to keep in mind are
that the remedy should be as economic and efficient as possible
while being oriented toward producing the most just and equitable
result obtainable in line with the general evolution of the law in that
particular area. In addition, the remedy should. squarely meet the
problem and be a substantial improvement over the existing situation.
The most obvious and simplest thing to do would be to revert
back to the former practice of disallowing both insurers from openly
participating in the action. This could be accomplished by litigating
the validity of a loan receipt, an issue which is not settled. 2 2 The
first case after Sellman to rule on a loan receipt was a 10th Circuit
case, Tyler v. Dowell, Inc.,2 which interpreted Sellman as holding
'
the ". . . loan was in fact payment of the loss." "' This reasoning
doesn't seem to follow, because Sellman did not reach the issue of
the determination of the legal effect of the loan receipt. The Circuit
Court seems to have felt that Sellman meant that loan receipts would
be held invalid if the issue was ever raised. This was not the case,
however, since the next case to deal with the issue, Home Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,2 s stated that the
2
Sellman case was not authority on the validity of loan receipts. 6
Although this determination was not dispositive of the case, it provides good reason to believe that if a loan receipt is litigated, the
court will probably hold it to be a valid loan. All the other cases
citing Sellman have been on the indispensible party issue, and do not
deal with loan receipts. Therefore, since the New Mexico Supreme
Court has intimated that a loan receipt would probably be considered a valid loan, use of this device would allow the plaintiff's
insurer to withdraw to the sidelines again. The objection to this
remedy is that it is against the general trend of the law. The direction
today seems to be toward more insurer involvement rather than less;
which would indicate that such a solution will probably be relatively
short-lived. 2 ' Besides, this would only reach part of the problem. It
22. The Sellman case did not rule on it. Rather, the case was determined in the absence
of the loan receipt.
23. 274 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1960).
24. Id. at 894.
25. 72 N.M. 163, 381 P.2d 675 (1963).
26. Id. at 167.
27. There are quite a number of inroads that have been made in the doctrine of
exclusion. In New Mexico and several other states, the insurer is a proper party and may be
joined if the insurance coverage is required by law. Lopez v. Townsend, 37 N.M. 574, 25
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would still leave the disclosure issue alive and would not contribute
toward efficiency and economy.
A second possibility is to freely allow disclosure of insurance. In
New Mexico, as the law on this subject stands today, 2 8 this is
almost a necessity because of the obvious prejudice against the
plaintiff that presently exists.
With all the literature on this subject that has already been written
and the considerable overlapping with the joinder issue, it seems
rather pointless to spend much time in this Comment discussing the
reasons and justifications for allowing disclosure of the existence or

limits of coverage to the jury as an independent subject.2 9 Suffice it

to say that it would be an improvement over the present situation.
In view of recent developments in the law in the federal courts and
in several of the states,3 0 allowance of disclosure is rapidly becoming
a strong current in the general trend of the law. But even with
disclosure there still remains a problem of duplication of effort and
judicial wastes brought about by the necessity of separate suits (in

some cases) to establish the liability of the defendant's insurer after a
judgment is obtained against the defendant. Although disclosure
would be a decided improvement, it does not extend nearly as far as
it should to adequately provide a remedy to the situation.
The best all-around solution would be to eliminate the fiction of
the disinterested insurer entirely by allowing compulsory joinder.
This innovation would best satisfy the criteria of efficiency and
economy, justice and equity, while squarely meeting the problem. It
P.2d 809 (1933); 2 R. Long, Law of Liability Insurance § 20.06(5) (1966). Two states,
Louisiana and Wisconsin, have direct action statutes. Rhode Island has a limited one (direct
action allowed if the insured cannot be served with process in the state). In 1968, the
Florida Court of Appeals overruled prior precedents and allowed joinder of an insurer on a
"quasi-3rd party beneficiary" theory. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593 (1st D.C.A.
Fla.
1968). And finally, Rule 26(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., as amended March 30, 1970 (effective
July 1, 1970) allows discovery of insurance. It does not affect its admissibility, though.
28. It is not allowed. Supra note 4.
29. Pro: Green, A Rebuttal, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 382 (1956); Green, Blindfolding the Jury,
33 Tex. L. Rev. 157 (1954); Comment, The Insurer as Party Defendant in Auto Accident
Cases, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 688; Note, 43 IU. L. Rev. 650 (1948); Allen, Why do Courts
Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies, 61 Am. L. Rev. 77 (1927). Contra, Gay, 'Blindfolding' the Jury: Another View, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 368 (1956); Appleman, Joinder of
Policyholder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22 Marq. L. Rev. 75 (1937); McKenna,
Joining the Insurer and Insured in Automobile Cases, 17 Marq. L. Rev. 114 (1932). For a
good discussion of the subject without taking a position see Leigh, Direct Actions Against
Liability Insurers, 1949 Ins. L. J. 633; and Lassiter, Direct Actions: Against the Insurer,
1949 Ins. L. J. 411. Two student works criticizing the Louisiana Direct action statute
because it doesn't go far enough are: Note, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 443 (1937); and Comment,
Direct Actions-Insurance Contracts, 13 La. L. Rev. 495 (1953). On how to properly
disclose the insurer without prejudicing the plaintiff's case, see Comment, ProperDisclosure
During Trial that Defendant is Insured, 26 Corn. L.Q. 137 (1940).
30. Supra note 27.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

is probably not the ultimate answer, but it is the best available. Aside
from the honesty of such an innovation, the strongest justification
from a practical point of view would be the substantial savings that
would ensue, both in legal fees paid by the respective parties and in
reduced costs to the state through elimination of multiple suits. Such
complete disposition of the case seems to be consistent with Rule
19(a)(1) which allows joinder of anyone in whose absence "complete
relief cannot be accorded."' ' The argument that complete relief
does not include execution of the judgment can be countered by the
fact that in the situation under discussion, the remedy following
judgment is not execution (if the insurer refuses liability) but a separate suit to establish the insurer's liability under its policy. Since
this is the case there seems to be no logical reason for requiring the
defendant, (or the plaintiff) to have to go through a separate suit
dealing with the same facts that were litigated in the first case. It
would be so much simpler to allow the insurer to present its defenses
in the first suit.
Presently, the only way joinder is allowed is when the defendant is
required by statute to carry liability coverage. 3 2 There is no authority in New Mexico on whether the Financial Responsibility Act
would qualify as such a statute, but most likely it would not since it
does not require a person to carry insurance; only that he be
financially responsible to certain stated limits for injuries resulting
from his negligent operation of an automobile.3 '
If the insurer does not voluntarily pay the judgment, the plaintiff
may have direct recourse against the insurer in equity, 3 4 garnishment, 3 s or in some cases, direct legal action. 6 But all of this would
be unnecessary if joinder was allowed, since determination of who
would be required to pay the judgment could be made without
having to resort to further litigation. It would be more beneficial to
all parties concerned to get this issue out of the way in the initial
suit.3 ' The savings in time and expense, along with the added incentives for settlement without trial, 3" are enough in themselves to
justify implementing this procedural innovation.
31. N.M. R. Civ. P.
32. Lopez v. Townsend, 37 N.M. 574, 25 P.2d 809 (1933).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 64-24-1 to 64-24-104 (Repl. 1960). But see Shingleton v.
Bussey, 223 So.2d 713, 717 (Fla. 1969).
43. 2 R. Long, Law of Liability Insurance, § 20.05 (1966).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 20.04, note 1, citing N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(7)(a) (1965).
37. This would lead to reduced costs for defending and administering the policy for the
defendant's insurer, savings to the plaintiffs insurer in eliminating the multiplicity of suits,
less wear and tear on the plaintiff, and less inconvenience for the defendant.
38. First, it would be an incentive to settlement since the insurers would be in a face-to-
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Short of outright joinder, in some instances the insurer can be
brought into the action by attachment. This procedure was upheld in
New York as a device for obtaining jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant.' 9 There is no reason why it couldn't be used for other
purposes, too. It should also be available as a security device ,40
particularly if the insurer is denying liability. The basic defect to this
procedure is that it is limited to those cases which can satisfy the
provisions of the attachment statute.4
There seem to be two basic arguments (other than the assumed
prejducial effects issue) against allowing joinder of the defendant's
insurer. First, it is contended that no cause of action exists between
the plaintiff and the defendant's insurer. This contention is based on
two grounds. The first ground is that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the insurer. Therefore no direct action is
possible because the plaintiff does not have a claim against the
insurer arising out of the defendant's contract.4 2 Secondly, it is
argued that an action on a contract cannot be joined in a suit in tort.
In light of the provisions in Rule 18(b), 4
it would seem the two
actions could be joined, but the courts have held otherwise. They
have ruled that 18(b) only applies to separate claims against the same
party,4 4 and that the insurer's right not to be joined is substantive so
it cannot be affected by a procedural rule.4 s On this ground, the
insurer appears to have a pretty strong argument against joinder, if
public policy demands that Rule 18(b) is to be so strictly
interpreted. Although some good arguments could be made that
might alter the conclusions reached on these two points, the road to
success in the face of so much directly opposed precedent would be
long and rocky. It is a fact of life that a court is usually quite
face bargaining position, and second, the adverse public image the insurers (especially the
defendant's insurer) would get by being continually in court should be an added incentive to
settlement. As it is now, the defendant's insurer is not in the public limelight.
39. Seiderv. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111,216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
40. Garnishment would probably be the proper remedy in this case, on the theory that
the insurer is holding assets of the insured. In Seider, id., the theory was based on the
contractual rights of the insured entitling him to a legal defense to be provided by the
insurer, who was in the jurisdiction.
41. The grounds for attachment and garnishment are identical. N.M. Stat. Ann
§ § 26-1-1 (1953) (attachment), 26-2-1 (Supp. 1969) (garnishment).
42. But see Shingleton v. Bussey, infra n. 63 where the court solves this problem by
applying a 3rd party beneficiary doctrine.
43. N.M. R. Civ. P.
44. Breeden v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 517, 273 P.2d 376 (1954); and see generally 2 Barron &
Holtzoff 80 et sec. (Wright Ed. 1961); annot., 76 A.L.R. 2d 385 (1958).
45. Breeden v. Wilson, supra; Headrick v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 11 F.R.D. 205
(E.D. Tenn. 1950). Both of these cases seem to add confusion to the substantive-procedural
distiction by not explaining the basis of their reasoning.
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hesitant in overruling its prior decisions even when presented with
46
convincing reasons why the old cases should be disregarded.
The second argument is based on the concept of the "disinterested
insurer." This designation is a somewhat nebulous appellation that
4
has been applied by the courts through judicial notice ' at the insistence of the disinterested insurer who is not a party to the action.
But, these allegations that the insurer is not an interested party become quite tenuous when its actions connected with the claim
against its insured are taken into consideration. The insurer investigates, provides legal counsel, assumes complete control of litigation,
negotiates settlements, and generally takes the initiative and responsibility of defending its insured against liability. All of these
services are provided before a judgment is obtained against its
insured. It is true that most of these services are provided for by
contract, but since the insurer drafts the contract, it would be fair to
assume that its terms were as he desired them to be. If the insurer is
truly disinterested, it is the only private entity this writer is aware of
that is allowed to act as a broker for legal services.
There have been some recent developments in Florida that go a
long way toward putting this whole matter in the proper perspective.
In 1966 the Florida Bar petitioned the supreme court for an addi4
tional rule governing the conduct of attorneys. 8 The proposed rule
would have barred a lawyer employed by a lay agency, particularly
an insurance company, from rendering services to or for persons
other than his employer. It was primarily directed at the ethical
conflict that could arise from representing two clients in the same
action.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company filed a brief in opposition to
the proposed rule (which brief was subscribed to and adopted in a
brief amici curiae filed by three associations purporting to represent
659 insurance companies in Florida).4" In the brief, Liberty Mutual
contended that their attorneys were not guilty of unethical conduct
because they were defending the rights of the insurance companies,
who had a real interest therein." ' o They cited such factors as
' '
and the
the ". . . 'direct financial interest' of the insurer,"
S
"identity and community of interest in the defense," 2 and that
46. The courts have developed a doctrine for application when such an issue arises that
can best be described as "passing the buck to the legislature".
47. Supra note 18.
48. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So.2d 593, at 595 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
49. In Re Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969).
50. Bussey v. Shingleton, at 597.
51. Id. at 595.
52. Id.
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the interest involved in defense of liability suits is primarily and

ultimately the interest of the insurance company,"' 1 3 as further
indications of their attorneys' propriety of conduct.
The court expressed their agreement with the Bar on the conflict
of interest issue, stating that "(T)he announced motive of the Bar,
which we accept, is to protect the public against the dangers of
potentially duplicitous representation."5 s ' But, since the proposed
rule dealt only with so-called "house counsel" and the court felt that
the same problems existed with counsel hired for a particular case,
they denied the rule, but invited future consideration of the issue.' 5
While the rules hearing was pending, a case came before the
Florida district court of appeal asking that joinder of an insurer be
allowed.5 6 To show that the insurer was interested in the action, and
thereby a proper party for joinder, the plaintiff referred to the
Liberty Mutual brief.' 7 In deciding the case, the court stated that it
felt, because of recent developments in the law and public policy, the
matter deserved fresh consideration.5 8 Starting with the Florida rule
on parties,5 9 which allows any person who has or claims an interest
adverse to the plaintiff to be joined, they concluded that whether or
not the insurer was a real party in interest was a question of fact for
the jury.6 If the insurer was found to be a real party in interest,
then it was properly joined. If it was not properly joined, then, based
on the admissions in the Liberty Mutual brief, its attorneys were
engaged in unauthorized practice of law. 6 1 In a dictum towards the
end of their decision, the court concluded that public policy justified
construction of the joinder rule so it would allow the insurer to be
joined on the theory that injured persons should be considered
quasi-third party beneficiaries of the policy.6 2 So, they remanded
the case back to the trial court with instructions to decide whether
or not the insurer was a real party in interest.
The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari6 3 because of the
53. In Re Rules, at 8.
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Bussey v. Shingleton.
57. In Re Rules.
58. Bussey v. Shingleton, at 594.
59. Id. at 595.
60. Id. at 594. If this holding is correct, it raises a substantial question in the Sellman
case, supra note 5. If whether or not a person is a real party in interest is a jury question,
why did the New Mexico Supreme Court decide it as a matter of law?
61. Id.
62. Id. at 596.
63. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969). This is the Bussey v. Shingleton
case, on certioari to the Florida Supreme Court.
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conflict between the appeal court's holding and prior cases. They
accepted the quasi-third party beneficiary theory of the court below
as a basis for resolving the conflict. They ruled that, as a product of
prevailing public policy, a direct cause of action inured to the third
party beneficiary by operation of law at the time the plaintiff be6
came entitled to sue the insured. " This third party beneficiary
doctrine was held to encompass a cause of action against the insurer
6
in favor of members of the public. ' The court justified this holding
on what they felt was the intent expressed by the legislature in
6
enacting the Financial Responsibility Act; 6 that the policy was
secured as a ready means of satisfying any obligations that may
6
accrue to members of the public. 1 As a further justification they
held that the injured person had a substantial interest in preventing
the defendant from prejudicing his recovery by failing to cooperate
with the insurer, or otherwise causing a breach in thepolicy contract. 6 8 In other words, the injured person should be allowed enough
control over the defendant to prevent him from dissipating his assets.
Closely connected with this was the conflict of interest issue of the
attorneys representing two clients. The court also cited recent cases
of
which emphasized the importance of allowing judicial oversight
6 9
The
plaintiff.
the
to
prejudice
the policy provisions to prevent
decision of the appeals court was affirmed on the merits, and prior
decisions in conflict therewith were overruled. The net effect of the
ruling in this case was to establish a direct action against the insurer
by judicial decision, based on the identical rationale that other states
7
have used in enacting direct action statutes. 0
This third party beneficiary doctrine appears to be a very practical
method of accomplishing joinder. It has been well received in the
Florida courts. In fact, there has been a veritable flood of cases that
have followed the Shingleton rule in the brief period since the case
was decided. 7 I There seems to be no reason why this doctrine could
64. Id. 715 passim.
65. Id. at 716.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 719.
69. Id.
70. The rationale is that a direct action statute expresses the public policy that liability
insurance is obtained for the benefit of all persons that are injured (within the limits of the
intended purpose of the policy). 2 R. Long, Law of Liability Insurance § 20.06(1) (1966).
71. Cases following or citing Shingleton v. Bussey: Sutton v. Gomez, 234 So.2d 725 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (voir dire application); Duran v. McPherson et aL, 233 So.2d 639 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (Discovery of professional liability insurance allowed); Ross v. Bowling,
233 So.2d 415 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Rivenbark v. Ansley, 233 So.2d 157 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1970); Shipman v. Kinderman, 232 So.2d 21 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (medical malpractice);
Sherman v. Holzapfel, 231 So.2d 550 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
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not be applied in New Mexico. The New Mexico legislature has expressed the same policy in our version of the Financial Responsibility
Law as Florida did. 7 2 The same conditions with respect to liability
litigation exist here. Many of the same insurance companies are doing
business in the state. The standard liability policy in use here is the
same policy that is used in Florida. If for no other reason, the
Shingleton rule should be adopted in New Mexico so the nature of
the current situation would have a chance to mature into the sophisticated status our judicial system should possess. This is a chance for
New Mexico to assume a leadership role in the Southwest, and to
shift the burden of catching up to our sister states, instead of continually being the low man on the totem pole.
OWEN RUSSELL

Roberts, 231 So.2d 235 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230 So.2d
495 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (premises liability insurance); Kilcrease v. Kilcrease, 223 So.2d
755 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Barrios v. Dade County, 310 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(direct action allowed in New York suit on Florida accident); U. S. v. United Bonding Ins.
Co., 422 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 64-24-1 to 64-24-104 (Repl. 1960); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 324
(1968).

